Helene Cooper, writing in this Sunday’s New York Times Week In Review, looks at the question of past presidents talking to our international adversaries. In short, Cooper concludes that “The U.S. didn’t talk to Castro, but it did talk to Mao, and that is the path most taken.”
I actually find this article a bit misleading, at least as far as the Cuba policy implications go. My program at the New America Foundation is making the case that it is time to change U.S. policy on Cuba. That’s because once Cuba stabilized and reoriented itself to the post-Cold War world, the embargo ceased being an effective tool of policy, and instead has been a net positive for the Castro governments.
Unlike the situation with Iran, to get a better Cuba policy the next President of the United States really does not need a summit with Raul Castro. The argument for changing Cuba policy is independent of Havana’s action. Our existing policy is the biggest obstacle we face to a better outcome in Cuba.
Sure, it would be a good thing to re-establish diplomatic relations, but to change our policy, end the embargo and ease the severe and unconstitutional restrictions on the travel of American citizens, the White House just needs to talk to the folks at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue.
This is not rocket science. Changing the dysfunctional set of statutes, executive orders and administrative rules that comprise our current Cuba policy would, I believe, make life harder for Havana. By removing the embargo -- and our tacit support for anti-Castro paramilitaries in South Florida -- from the Castro government’s list of excuses why their economy is underperforming, or why Cubans need to maintain solidarity with the Revolution, the United States would be presenting Havana with a major internal challenge.
Of course, for that same reason, a full, unilateral policy change could end badly for U.S.-Cuban relations. This I want to avoid. But to establish a new diplomatic channel or normalize diplomatic relations does not require a summit.
Summitry is used as leverage or to celebrate and punctuate diplomatic breakthroughs. The obstacles to our Cuba policy, however, require no leverage over Havana and no diplomatic exchanges. There may be a time for a Cuban-U.S. Summit, but not until we implement a policy that actually serves our interests.