Two Cuba-related issues popped up this week that have been framed in some very narrow thinking about the nature of U.S. policy change towards Cuba.

The first is the appeal of the case of the Cuban Five to the Supreme Court. As many will know, five Cuban agents were arrested in South Florida as they were monitoring the activities of far right wing militant Cuban-American organizations, descendants of the bomb-throwing Omega-7 group who live for the opportunity to do the Bay of Pigs the right way. The five were arrested and convicted of espionage charges, which was itself a legal stretch, but when their request for a change of venue from Miami was denied, their case really hit legal la-la-land. Nevertheless, the five remain in Federal penitentiaries. The Supreme Court now has a chance to decide whether the case against the Five is constitutional.

The second issue is whether or not the United States should give the Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay back to the Cuban Government. Separate from the question of the detainee facility, Camp X-Ray, getting the naval base back is a long-standing dream of the Castro government as much as the camp is a symbol of the old way of conducting U.S. foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere. El Jefe himself just talked up the issue in a short dispatch in Granma.

The case of the Cuban Five often comes up in the context of a trade of prisoners: our five Cuban agents for the almost sixty remaining political prisoners in Cuban jails charged with working for the United States against the Revolution. Similarly, Guantanamo Bay comes up in the context of diplomatic quids and quos. The questions are always when in the negotiation would this issue or that issue become the right one to make the trade on.

That's a great conversation to have if you want a long career negotiating with the Cuban (or American) government. But it is the wrong way to satisfy U.S. hemispheric interests. All these bi-lateral issues with an impoverished nation of 11 million people are besides the point. Cuba is important to the United States not because it is a threat, but because our own failed policy towards the island keeps us from engaging our neighbors in Latin America the way we need to in the midst of the worst global economic crisis since the Great Depression.

And we cannot do that until we end the embargo. The Obama administration should not underestimate the power of the embargo as a symbol of all the wrong-headed approaches to Latin America we have tried over the last two hundred years. Last December, the collected heads of state from the region affirmed essentially the same thing. Beyond that, ending the embargo sets up a level of trust with our regional neighbors that cannot be replicated with any other move.

Sure, this economic crisis is big enough that some countries will work with us to some extent. But the U.S. cannot afford incrementalism in global economic policy either. It is time to clear the decks and re-engage Latin America in a sustainable, inclusive new regional strategy.

Save the second-tier diplomatic trade-offs with Havana for later.