The recently turned-off ticker sign at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana.

I want to share a little nugget of my analysis that helps to get past the zero-sum conditionality question that my colleagues John McAuliff and Phil Peters have recently posted on.

I think we can describe the current U.S. policy as having the following attributes:

1. Rhetorical Caution
2. Regulatory Inertia
3. Operational License

Here's what I mean. When the Obama administration has discussed the future of U.S.-Cuba relations, it has generally indicated that it will fulfill two campaign promises: to allow unrestricted family travel and remittances and to engage in talks with all of America's adversaries. And from a declaratory perspective, Obama has done just that. Having announced these two policy changes, it is apparently comfortable standing pat, at least from the podium in Washington. There are a lot of other issues that the Administration is, rightly or wrongly, more concerned about, and until a crisis or incredible breakthrough opportunity presents itself, I anticipate little effort will be expended by the White House on Cuba.

That little bit of change, however, has angered at least one important Senate Democrat, Senator Bob Menendez, who chairs the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee. So, in a sop to the senior senator from New Jersey, the Obama administration has played a little shell game, and has not yet implemented the changes in policy that the President announced back in April around family travel, remittances, and trade. Even though many Cuban Americans are under the impression that the policy has changed, technically, if they travel or remit more than they were allowed under President Bush, they could be fined. By holding the bureaucracy back, the administration can have it both ways. For a while.

The final characteristic of the present policy is as operational license. Here's what I mean. There are at least three offices with responsibilities that place them in contact with Cubans: the JTF commander at Guantanamo, the principal deputy assistant Secretary of State who is negotiating the migration and mail talks, and the chief of the U.S. Interests Section. In each case, these offices have been given the space to move the relationship forward in public ways. The JTF Commander in Guantanamo conducted a joint U.S.-Cuban mass casualty exercise earlier this month. The PDAS conducted successful negotiations around migration and mail service with talk of more meetings in Havana in December, and the Interests Section has turned off the 24-hour ticker sign that went up in the Bush administration. All pragmatic confidence-building measures that signal a willingness to make progress on common interests.

And that's where I think this administration is headed. There are many issues that the two governments can work on that will build trust, build a working relationship and actually contribute meaningfully to the economic, security, and environmental interests of these two neighbors. Where we will not see progress, at least at this stage, is on "full normalization" or "ending the embargo" on the U.S. side or on "democracy" or "human rights" on the Cuban side.

That's because the politics of Cuba in the United States have shifted in Miami and Washington but have not yet been fully consolidated. That is happening and will continue to advance, short of North Korea putting nuclear missiles into Cuba. On the Cuban side, they will simply never negotiate their political order and they believe that human rights is larger than freedom of speech and must include economic and social rights.

What is interesting is that this framework policy allows for other actors, such as Congress, to change the situation, such as the travel ban, and receive a positive response and for progress on many bilateral issues to be advanced without crossing into the current red zones of the embargo and democracy/human rights. In other words, there is enough room to get things done, but little for major headlines.