Yesterday the Miami Herald picked up a claim made by Mauricio Claver-Carone on his blog Capitol Hill Cubans that the family travel restrictions proposed by Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart (and now included in the omnibus spending bill filed by House Republicans early this morning) wouldn't be so bad as the "hyperbolic" media insists on reporting:
The media seems unable to escape hyperbole regarding the Cuba provision being discussed in the Omnibus Appropriations bill. So without speculating on the end-result,
. . . Legally, the provision would restore the Bush Administration's limit of one-trip every three years. However, since the Omnibus is a spending bill with a one-year duration, the practical effect of the provision would be to limit Cuban-American travel to only one-trip in 2012 -- both reasonable and humanitarian (and akin to the Clinton Administration's prior limits).
This would be an significant clarification to make if it were in fact true (though, significant to a point: I know I like to see my family more than once year and so I imagine it shouldn't change any minds truly committed to family rights). But anyone who follows Congress as closely as does Mr. Claver-Carone ought to know that non-time limited policy riders often get attached to one-year spending bills, much to the chagrin of the appropriators and to opponents of such riders. These policy riders only expire when they look like this:
"Sec. 632. During fiscal year 2012, for purposes of section 908(b)(1) of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7207(b)(1)), the term "payment of cash in advance" shall be interpreted as payment before the transfer of title to, and control of, the exported items to the Cuban purchaser." [Emphasis added]
The provision above was first included in a spending bill in FY 2009. It continues to be included each subsequent year because of the clause "During fiscal year." Nowhere in the Diaz-Balart amendment does it say the provison expires with the end of the fiscal year. But please, don't take my word for it: Read it for yourself here (page 358, section 634).
Alan Gross has been in prison for two years. His case, like that of the Cuban Five, should be resolved compassionately during the coming Christmas / Chanukah / New Year holiday.
Phil Peters, a former Foreign Service officer has written in an excellent Cuban Triangle blog post
"In effect, the U.S. message is that its agents are free to operate at will on Cuban territory and Cuban authorities have no right to intervene.
Call that what you will, but it is the direct opposite of an effort to free Alan Gross."
Alan's wife has identified the only path to freeing her husband:
Judy Gross also is raising the volume on her criticism of the Obama administration and the apparent unwillingness of anyone on either side of the Florida Straits to sit down and have constructive discussions that would secure her husband's release.
"The State Department has put in a great deal of hours on the case, I'll say that," she said, but she added that the Obama administration "has kept their hands off of it."
"At least publicly," she said. "I've not heard from them once." …
The Cubans need a graceful way to let her husband go, Judy Gross said, and the politics of U.S.-Cuba relations haven't made that easy.
"There's some very powerful vocal people in the Congress who are not favorable to sitting down and negotiating anything with the Cubans," she said. "If you don't negotiate, you don't get anything."
Below are excerpts of a statement by President Obama today in honor of Laura Pollan, a founder of Cuba's Ladies in White who passed away earlier this year, and in defense of Cuban family travel rights:
"Today, as the National Endowment for Democracy awards the Democracy Service Medal posthumously to Laura Pollán, the founder of Las Damas de Blanco, we honor and celebrate her life by recognizing her significant contributions to the struggle to defend human rights in Cuba. . .
"Though Laura is not with us today, her bravery in the face of repression and her selfless commitment to democracy and human rights in Cuba, offer a living legacy that inspires us to keep moving forward. To Las Damas de Blanco who will watch or listen to today’s ceremony, you have our utmost respect for your efforts to stand up for the rights of the Cuban people even in the face of this weekend’s crackdown directed at you and we honor each of you as well .
The United States is steadfast in supporting the simple desire of the Cuban people to freely determine their future and to enjoy the rights and freedoms that define the Americas, and that should be universal to all human beings. I remain committed to supporting civil society in Cuba, including by protecting the ability of Cuban Americans to support their families in Cuba through unrestricted family visits and remittances." (emphasis added)
If Republican leaders in the House get their way in omnibus spending bill negotiations this week, hundreds of thousands of Cuban Americans now accustomed to a freedom few other Americans enjoy – the right to travel to Cuba without U.S. government intervention – could lose it. A provision House leaders are pushing in final round negotiations this week would subject hundreds of thousands of Cuban Americans to a Bush administration rule allowing them just one visit home every three years, no exceptions. The measure, championed by a Cuban American, Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart, is one of just a few controversial riders still to be worked out in order to advance legislation this week to fund numerous government agencies.
President Obama confidently campaigned on lifting family travel restrictions for Cuban Americans back in 2008. He delivered on that promise, and judging by the numbers of travelers, it was a politically popular move. So when House appropriators originally adopted Diaz-Balart’s provision last summer, White House advisors threatened, in a formal Statement of Administration Policy, to recommend a veto if the final bill contained changes to the president’s Cuba policy.
As the second anniversary of USAID sub-contractor Alan Gross’s arrest in Cuba approaches, his family and representatives in Congress are stepping up efforts to win his release from prison. But which, if any, of their efforts will make the difference?
Maryland representative Chris Van Hollen says the door is “closed” to improved relations with Cuba so long as Gross remains in jail. It's a line to which Cuban officials are well accustomed over the last half a century of U.S.-Cuban relations. And a Republican contender for Senator Ben Cardin’s seat (D-MD), Richard Douglas, has a laundry list of punitive measures the Obama administration and a more “resolute” senator should initiate to win Gross’s freedom. Douglas thinks all flights and financial transactions between the U.S. and Cuba should be halted, all Cuban visas should be revoked, even for U.N. diplomats (I’m not sure we can prevent Cuban diplomats from staffing their U.N. mission though), and the list goes on. Hit ‘em where it hurts, he reasons.
We’ve been hitting the Cubans where it hurts for so many years it just doesn’t hurt them anymore. True, family remittances to the island are a tremendous boost not only to Cubans who receive them but to the broader Cuban economy and thus the Cuban government. But Mr. Douglas is misled if he thinks hundreds of thousands of Cuban Americans will suddenly stop returning to the island and sending money to relatives just because the U.S. government makes it more difficult.
More to the point: I can’t think of one instance where the Castro government (either Fidel or Raul) has actually capitulated to U.S. pressure or punishment. I think that history shows quite plainly that not only does U.S. punishment fail to get the results we want, but it often causes an even more hardline response from Havana. In 2004, as the Bush administration tightened nearly every screw at its disposal – limiting travel, remittances, and gift parcels to the island, and going after foreign banks willing to accept U.S. dollar deposits from Cuba – the Cuban government responded by eliminating U.S. dollars as legal tender on the island and slapping a 10% surcharge on dollar exchanges to Cuban convertible pesos.
If pounding our fists on the table doesn’t work, public shaming – as employed by former New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson on his last trip to Cuba – doesn’t work any better. But so far, informed, diplomatic requests haven’t done the trick either, though that approach has enabled several American delegations to visit Mr. Gross personally in prison.
As a Cuba policy analyst, I’ve given a surprising amount of thought to our policy toward the politically isolated, resource-rich nation of Burma (Myanmar) half a world away.
That’s because I used to work for Senator Max Baucus, who in 2003, working with Senators Mitch McConnell, Dianne Feinstein and Chuck Grassley, helped pass smart sanctions against the Burmese Regime. At the time, Congressional supporters of Aung San Suu Kyi wanted to punish the regime for its crackdown on Suu Kyi and her supporters, but Baucus and Grassley made sure that the sanctions would not be open-ended. With this new sanctions model, Congress would continue to exercise real oversight over the impact of the sanctions and of the Executive’s efforts to bring other nations on board. (Here's what Baucus had to say when the sanctions were renewed in 2007.)
With the news that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will be making an historic trip to Burma, now might be an interesting time for Burma experts to debate whether it was U.S. sanctions, or Chinese influence (too much of it), or any other combination of factors that have led to Burma’s leaders to take steps that have registered as "flickers of progress" with President Obama of late. But more importantly, over at The Atlantic, Joshua Kurlantzick has offered up “5 Ways to Tell if Burma's Reforms Are Really Working,” which could be helpful to the Obama administration in determining how far to engage the Burmese government. After all, if the reforms continue and the administration wants to support them –and the leaders behind them – the President may wish to urge Congress to let the sanctions expire when they come up for renewal next summer. And if not, he can urge their renewal.
Unlike the maze of Congressionally-mandated sanctions against Cuba enacted over the last several decades, the Burma sanctions were designed to expire unless proponents make a compelling case to renew them. The sanctions only last a year, unless Congress passes a joint resolution to renew them another year. Imminent expiration of the sanctions means that Congress actually monitors and evaluates the effectiveness of its policy toward Burma every year, instead of leaving the sanctions in place indefinitely at the whim of the single most interested member or members of Congress, as in the case of the Cuba embargo. With U.S. sanctions always just a vote away from expiration, the Burmese government has a clear picture of the levers at work in the U.S. government and a real incentive to take steps that would encourage U.S. policymakers to scrap them.
But because the Cuba sanctions are open-ended and lack meaningful oversight, Cuban officials insist they can have little confidence that the U.S. will actually take significant steps to improve the relationship even if Cuba does.
A case in point: two years ago, President Obama sent a message to Cuba’s leaders via our Spanish allies:
I’ve just finished reading a new report by Professor Richard Feinberg, a former Clinton administration official and non-resident fellow at the Brookings Institution. “Reaching Out: Cuba’s New Economy and the International Response,” clocked in at a daunting 101 pages but should nonetheless be required reading for anyone following the island nation’s long-awaited economic restructuring.
Cuba’s economic transformation is a hot topic, to be sure; another excellent report, Cuba’s New Resolve: Economic Reform and Its Implications for U.S. Policy, written by Cuba expert Collin Laverty for the Center for Democracy in the Americas, offers a detailed look at Cuba’s economic reforms to date, and in so doing, lays to rest any question of whether these reforms are just a temporary fix or irreversible. If Cuba’s New Resolve argues that Cuba is serious about its economic reforms, Reaching Out offers what the international community should do about it with an 800 pound gorilla - the U.S. embargo - in the room.
I’ll admit that after reading Feinberg’s introduction, I next skipped to the middle for both a history lesson and a pragmatic, creative vision for Raul Castro’s Cuba to reconnect with the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as well as with regional development banks, in spite of opposition from the United States.
Feinberg unravels the conventional wisdom that says Cuba and the IFIs would make unhappy bedfellows – Cuba withdrew from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund more than 40 years ago – by pointing to successful IFI engagement with nonmembers like Kosovo and South Sudan, and with proud and strong states like Ortega's Nicaragua and Vietnam, with which Cuba shares key similarities. The IFIs are more interested in “the long game,” Feinberg argues, and their willingness to take things step by step would fit nicely with Cuba’s (urgent) need for gradual changes. He talks to both sides and a senior Cuban diplomat tells him that “Cuba has no principled position against” engagement with the IFIs - a statement Feinberg believes signals a real shift in Cuban policy (hopefully a Cuban official will field that question publicly in the not too distant future).
Meanwhile, IFI experts are more than ready to engage Cuba, and Feinberg argues that U.S. opposition to IFI assistance isn’t as insurmountable as it might seem. In particular, IFIs can work through trust funds and other donors can administer programs. Feinberg also sees a role for regional development banks such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the Andean Development Corporation, as the U.S. isn’t a member.
At a time when the United States is noticeable absent and seemingly oblivious to the critical moment at hand in Cuba, Feinberg offers immediate, actionable recommendations for the international development community to engage Cuba now, when it can clearly have a tremendous impact on the breadth, depth and success of the reforms. His recommendations for the IFIs, Cuban policymakers and the United States include:
Wonk-out alert: For those who missed the action on the Senate floor yesterday, The Hill reports that Senator Reid’s “Minibus” appropriations bill nearly crashed over Cuba provisions contained in the bill. Those provisions were 1) a provision passed in FY 09, FY10 and FY11 that defines the term “cash in advance” for the purpose of complying with a 2000 law that authorized cash in advance food exports to the island, and 2) a provision that would have blocked enforcement funds for a prohibition on Cuban buyers routing their payments for U.S. purchases directly, rather than through a third country bank.
The former provision was in the original Financial Services Appropriations bill when it was considered by the full Appropriations Committee in September. The latter provision, championed by Senators Jerry Moran (R-KS) and Ben Nelson (D-NE), was attached to the bill by a vote of 20 to 10 in that committee. The vote was significant – for Cuban watchers, anyway – because the Chairs of the Intelligence and Banking Committees, and the chair of the Financial Services Appropriations Subcommittee, spoke in favor of the amendment, and because 6 Republicans, including the Ranking Member of the full committee, joined 14 Democrats in voting for it.
These provisions aren’t exactly huge chunks of the U.S. embargo. What they would do is inch a bit closer towards reasonable and reliable terms of export (you can’t really call one-way transactions “trade”, can you?), something which the agriculture export community in the U.S. has been pushing for since a 2005 Bush administration rule made cash-in-advance sales impossible to transact. The sales, though they dropped and continue to drop, have continued because the law also allowed for foreign letters of credit in payment, something larger exporters are quite used to and comfortable with. Taken together, the two rules added cost and volatility to the sales. Small bore though they may be, the agriculture export provisions give embargo supporters like Senators Rubio, Menenedez and Nelson (of Florida) heartburn because better export terms means more exports and better ties between Cuba and an influencial sector here in the U.S., which in turn could lead to further dismantling of the embargo.
What I can’t yet explain is why the provisions were vulnerable to the Senate rule against authorizing or legislating policy on a spending bill. The Moran provision that came out of Committee was simply a prohibition on funding, and shouldn’t have fallen upon such a challenge. UPDATE #1:
A self-employed vendor of sunglasses in Havana
“The Cuban government has said that it wants to transition, to loosen up the economy, so that businesses can operate more freely. We have not seen evidence that they have been sufficiently aggressive in changing their policies economically”
President Obama in first meeting with Hispanic journalists, September 12, 2011
"But there is a basic, I think, recognition of people’s human rights that includes their right to work, to change jobs, to get an education, to start a business. So some elements of freedom are included in how an economic system works. And right now, we haven’t seen any of that."
President Obama in second meeting with Hispanic journalists, September 28, 2011
The Obama Administration has minimized the significance of economic reforms underway in Cuba, a part of its rationalization for limiting change in bilateral relations. Leaving aside the counterproductive illogic of that position as policy, it is disturbing to think they really might be so woefully misinformed.
Some of the personnel in the US Interests Section in Havana have a cold war political bias that may affect their reporting, but some don't. It may be that staff in the National Security Council are still giving disproportionate weight to the perspective of the old guard in Miami, but surely others in the White House read the US and international press!
Whatever the reason, ignorance will be less of a defense after publication last week of an excellent comprehensive report by Collin Laverty issued by our colleagues at the Center for Democracy in the Americas. "Cuba’s New Resolve: Economic Reform and its Implications for U.S. Policy" , available on line here.